The year of 2020 was a watershed in my life. Although the outbreak of Covid-19 was not the cause, but it provided a fertile ground for some of my greatest mistakes to grow. The sudden onslaught of the unprecedented pandemic prompted me to think very hard on what would happen next, including some of the opportunities coming along the way. Food security was one major issue at heart and I began to develop a confirmation bias in concluding that it’s where I should start digging towards the goldmine.
A few months into the lock down, I came across an agriculture expert (more of a wannabe in hindsight) showing me the potential of integrated farming centred around aquaponics. The idea was about producing food that is safe and environmentally friendly while the waste generated is used to support other crops in the farm. The idea of circular farming with multiple revenue streams is noble and has worked in places like Israel on the back of its technological prowess but whether it would work here is another story. In fact, that’s a long story which hinges on local market condition, weather, geographical factors, government support, competition and the characteristics of the entire supply chain.
I did perform some research in this area but it revolved very much around the technical side of aquaponic farming because that’s what I know the least at that moment. When it came to the economics of the business, my analysis was laden with assumptions which are way too optimistic in hindsight. I couldn’t see any reason for that other than a strong confirmation bias planted in my mind and I humbly admit that it was an unforced error that led to many others.
I invested a large sum of money (in relative term compared to my tiny net worth) and spent a year constructing the farm. I sacrificed many weekends and slogged under the rain and sun, battling all sorts of problems. Basically, every single piece of equipment that could break down did break down at some point. Construction was delayed due to the lock down and I overran my budget due to many unforeseen difficulties. At the same time, I had to fend off some local gangsters asking for “security fees”.
I went through another six months completing the first cycle of production with no less pain and frustration. Compared to dealing with mechanical failures, handling biological assets sent my stress level through the roof in no time. I’ve gone through the emotional pangs of seeing thousands of dead fishes floating on my pond overnight. It’s one thing dealing with the usual inventory obsolescence in a business, it’s another level of pain handling inventory that can turn absolutely worthless in just a few hours. Having sleepless nights is an understatement.
The first cycle was completed successfully, though financially at loss. I’ve obtained the data I needed and figured out what needed to be done to improve things. Throughout this period, I visited many other farm operators and spoke to many players in the supply chain including feed suppliers, animal health experts, fish distributors, wholesalers, agriculture researchers, farming association members etc. I consolidated all the information obtained with my own experience and operational data to decide what to do next. Then I realised that the writing was already on the wall. Within weeks, I decided to close down the operation and cut my losses immediately. Despite the pain, I knew in my heart that it’s the right thing to do.
Until today, I regard that as one of the best decisions I’ve ever made in the middle of all the mistakes. As for the rationale behind that, I would love to explain in a separate post.